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This paper analyzes policies to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) based on a sample 
comprising  the  US  plus  six  EU  countries  (US-plus-EU-6)  and  four  Central  and  Eastern 
European Countries (CEEC-4). The analysis draws on industry-level data for 1995-2003. A 
Dynamic  Panel  Data  approach  is  used  to  isolate  important  country-  and  industry-level 
determinants of FDI inward stock. The estimated baseline model derived is used to assess 
the scope for FDI attraction policies. The scope for FDI is defined as the difference between 
the FDI inward stock received by a country-industry-pair, as implied by the baseline model 
(“estimated  FDI”),  and  the  inward  FDI  stock  which  could  be  realized  if  a  certain  “best 
practice”  policy  were  carried  out  (“potential”  FDI).  The  results  show  how  different  policy 
variables contribute to closing the gap between estimated and potential FDI. The countries in 
our sample fall into two groups: In the CEEC-4 an increase of R&D expenditures in GDP 
would result in a substantial increase in FDI, while in the US-plus-EU-6 an improvement of 
their unit labor cost position, e.g. via increases in labor productivity, and improvements in 
their tax position would attract additional FDI.  
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Policies to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) have become standard in most countries, 
irrespective of their level of development, geographical location or industrial structure. One of 
the most important policy questions is: (i) What should be done in order to attract inward 
FDI? This question asks which policy variables can be used to attract FDI in general. Here, a 
policy  variable  is  defined  as  a  determinant  of  FDI  which  can  be  directly  influenced  by 
governments (“policy makers”) in the short run.
1 A related question is: (ii) How large is the 
scope for FDI in general and in certain industries in particular? The scope for FDI is defined 
as the amount of additional FDI, which could be attracted if FDI-relevant policy variables 
were improved towards an international “best practice policy”. 
In this paper we address both of these questions with the aim of providing some insight to 
policy makers seeking promising areas of action and an efficient means of conducting FDI 
attraction policies. To this end, we isolate the economically and statistically most important 
determinants of inward FDI stock in the US and 6 EU member countries (US-plus-EU-6) as 
well as in four Central and Eastern European Countries
2 (CEEC-4) over a time span of nine 
years (1995 - 2003) using industry-level data. In doing so, we place a particular focus on five 
policy variables: taxes, R&D expenditures, unit labor costs, the skill level of workers and the 
FDI-related  institutional  environment,  which  are  continuously  mentioned  in  the  public 
discussion.  
We proceed in two steps: (i) estimation of a baseline model using econometric methods for 
dynamic  panel  models  and  (ii)  calculation  of  gaps  between  estimated  and  potential  FDI 
                                                            
1 Examples are taxes, R&D expenditures or the institutional environment. Factors that can only be influenced 
indirectly or in the medium to long run might be called “intervention variables”. The inflation rate would be an 
example for such a variable. 
2 The EU countries included are: Austria (AUT), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Great Britain (GBR), the Netherlands 
(NLD), Germany (GER), the Czech Republic (CZE), Hungary (HUN), Slovenia (SVN) and Slovakia (SVK).   2 
inward stock based on the definition of “best practice policy” values of the included policy 
variables. The calculated gaps show which location factors should be addressed by policy 
makers to increase FDI inward stock in certain industries. 
Despite an econometric analysis shows which variables impact economically and statistically 
significant on inward FDI stock it does not give an impresion which of the (policy) variables 
should be altered to attract FDI given a country's relative position with respect to the various 
policy measures, i.e. whether a country is below or above the "best practice policy” values. 
Put  differently,  an  analysis  based  on  the  gap  between  estimated  and  potential  FDI  also 
shows  which  FDI  attraction  policies  should  be  carried  out  by  a  particular  country  in  a 
particular industry. 
In relation to our approach, several studies have been carried out based on FDI data at the 
industry level. Resmini (2000) uses FDI flow data (i.e. FDI flows in US dollars in 10 CEECs in 
four  subcategories  of  the  manufacturing  sector  using  the  Pavitt  classification;  see  Pavitt, 
1984)  over  1991-1995.  Bénassy-Quéré  et  al.  (2007a)  use  FDI  stock  data  (i.e.  capital 
expenditures by US majority-owned affiliates) in 18 EU members for eleven industries over 
1994-2002.  Yeaple  (2003)  analyzes  the  role  of  skill  endowments  for  the  structure  of  US 
outward FDI defined in terms of the sales of U.S. multinationals’ majority-owned affiliates 
abroad based on the benchmark survey of 1994, covering 39 countries (no CEEC) and 50 
manufacturing industries. Basically, these studies confirm the traditional determinants of FDI 
– foremost market-related  and  efficiency-related  location factors. With  respect to the first 
policy variable of main interest in this paper (tax rates) these studies reveal that countries 
with  a  high  corporate  income  tax  rate  receive  less  FDI  (Yeaple  2003,  p.  730,  Table  1; 
Bénassy-Quéré  et  al.  2007,  p.  37ff., Tables  1  and  2;  whereas  taxes  are  not  included  in 
Resmini 2000). The second policy variable of main interest in this paper, R&D expenditures 
in GDP, has not been included in the studies just mentioned. The third policy variable of main 
interest, the institutional environment, is reflected by a number of single indicators, but in 
general has not been given much emphasis in other studies using industry-level data. Yeaple 
(2003) uses an indicator reflecting a country’s openness to FDI. His finding suggests that the   3 
effect of barriers to FDI is larger for vertical FDI (re-exporting) than for local market oriented 
FDI. Recently, Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007b) focused on home and host country institutional 
determinants of FDI on the basis of a unique database which includes firm-level data on the 
institutional  quality.  Their  findings  suggest  “that  efforts  towards  raising  the  quality  of 
institutions  and  making  them  converge  towards  those  of  source  countries  may  help 
developing countries to receive more FDI. The orders of magnitude found in the paper are 
large, meaning that moving from a low level to a high level of institutional quality could have 
as much impact as suddenly becoming a neighbour of a source country.” (ibidem, p. 781) 
These and other findings suggest that including institutional determinants of FDI is indeed 
important in the empirical research of policy determinants. 
Concerning the calculation of gaps among recent studies which include CEECs in an effort to 
estimate FDI potential, Demekas et al. (2007) and Resmini (2000) are particularly relevant. 
Demekas et al. (2007) use FDI stocks to derive the concept of potential FDI “… using the 
actual values of exogenous variables and the ‘best’ values the policy variables can take.” (p. 
378). The gap is defined as the level of FDI predicted by the model, which is based on the 
actual values of exogenous variables and potential FDI calculated using the “best practice 
policy” values of policy variables. Here, the “best” values are defined as the lowest or highest 
values of each location factor in the sample. The calculated gaps range from 2 to 83 percent, 
depending  on  the  country  in  question.  Demekas  et  al.  (2007)  point  out  that  their  effects 
should be interpreted as short run effects and that “… the government may have limited 
control over some policy variables in the short term.” (p. 379). One drawback of this study is, 
however,  that  it  seems  questionable  that  using  minimum  and  maximum  values  as  “best 
practice  policy”  values  will  reflect  likely  policy  scenarios  in  a  sample  of  heterogenous 
countries, especially in the short run. A change of policy variables by a substantial amount 
can usually only be achieved in the medium to long run.  
Resmini (2000) defines the gap as the ratio of actual FDI flows to the fitted values from her 
baseline  specification  and  distinguishes  several  types  of  industries  in  CEECs  in  1995 
(according to the Pavitt taxonomy). The estimated gaps range from 43 percent for high-tech   4 
sectors  to  88  percent  in  traditional  sectors  (see  Table  5  in  Resmini  2000  for  details).  A 
drawback of this study is that the fitted values from her benchmark specification are used to 
represent FDI “potential”. Yet, from a statistical point of view, the gap between this potential 
FDI  and  actual  FDI  values  reflects  that  part  of  the  model  which  is  not  explained  by  the 
variables included in the model. Thus, this gap cannot be closed by changing the policy 
variables included in the model. Therefore, we essentially follow the approach suggested in 
Demekas et al. (2007) using two alternative specifications of the “best practice policy” values. 
The  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  in  several  ways.  First,  FDI  inward  stocks  at  the 
industry level, which are a reasonable proxy for the distribution of productive capital across 
countries and industries (e.g. Blonigen et al. 2003), are used as the dependent variable. 
Thereby, the dynamic nature of the data generation process underlying the FDI stock data is 
modeled. Second, gaps between estimated and potential FDI inward stocks are calculated 
for the US-plus-EU-6 and CEEC-4, separated by policy variables as well as by countries and 
by  industries  to  reveal  which  policy  variables  policy  makers  should  use  to  increase  FDI 
inward  stock  in  certain industries. Third,  another  novelty  of  this  paper  is  the  inclusion  of 
variables at an industry level – such as the share of low-skilled workers or unit labor costs 
based on hours worked – which have only recently been made available.
3  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical model on which our 
analysis is based and in section 3 we give information concerning methodological aspects. 
The results are shown and discussed in section 4. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. The empirical model 
 
In order to isolate the relevant determinants of the FDI location decision of a Multinational 
Enterprise (MNE) we assume that, out of a number of k potential locations (countries), a firm 
will  decide  to  invest  where  after-tax  profits  (
net P )  are  higher  compared  to  alternative 
                                                            
3 Specifically, data from the EU-KLEMS project are used.   5 
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net location FDI P P = (see  Devereux  and  Griffith  1998:  344  and 
349). The crucial question in deriving the empirical model is, therefore, which location factors 
impact on the after-tax profit of an investment. Moreover, as the FDI inward stock usually 
shows  high  serial  dependence  and  to  neglect  this  serial  correlation  might  lead  to  a 
dynamically  mis-specified  empirical  model,  our  empirical  specification  is  derived  from  a 
dynamic  panel  data framework.  Specifically,  variants  of the following  equation  (1)  will  be 




Thus,  ijt FDI log  is the logarithm of the inward FDI stock of country i, sector j in year t.  it X  
are location factors which vary over countries and over time and  ijt Z  are variables which vary 
over  time  and  over  country-industry  pairs.  t g   are  time  dummies  (TD),  ij a   are  country-
industry-pair-specific  fixed  effects,  which  capture  the  impact  of  time-invariant  country, 
industry and country-industry factors and  ijt e  is the remainder error term.  
Which factors have an impact on the after-tax profit of an investment and thus need to be 
included in  t i X ,  and  t ij Z , ? Generally, gross profits are a function of revenues and production 
costs, which crucially depend on the optimal level of output. Put differently, inter alia, gross 
profits  depend  on  the  determinants  of  marginal  costs  and  marginal  revenues.  These 
determinants  include  factors  like  the  market  size,  gross  wages,  labor  productivity  or  the 
availability of capital (Devereux and Griffith 1998: 343; Clausing and Dorobantu 2005: 87). 
Furthermore, gross profits also depend on any fixed costs incurred by investing in a foreign 
location.  For  example,  a  country’s  political  and  macroeconomic  risk  level  may  generate 
transaction costs that have to be covered independently of any effective production activity. 
Net or after-tax profits additionally depend on the taxation of profits in the host country. 
                                                            
4 Specifically, the xtabond2 Stata program of D. Roodman (see e.g. Roodman 2007a) is used.   6 
We separate the location factors into market- and efficiency-related variables (e.g. Markusen 
and  Maskus  2002),  with  the  first  mainly  influencing  marginal  revenues  and  the  latter 
influencing  marginal  and  fixed  costs.  The  variables  considered  are  the  market  potential 
( it Pot ) and the GDP per capita ( it GDPcap ) of a host country i, unit labor costs ( t ij Ulc , ), the 
share of low-skilled hours worked ( t ij ls H , _ ), the average effective tax rates on corporate 
profits ( it Eatr ), private and public R&D expenditures as percent of GDP ( it Gerd ), the political 
risk level ( it Risk ) and the macroeconomic risk level ( it Inflation ). Moreover we use the level 
of legal barriers to FDI ( it Freefdi ), which can be considered as a precondition for market- 
and efficiency-related FDI to take place (cf. Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Classification of Location factors 
Group  Country-level variability  Country-industry-level variability 
Market related 
variables 
Market potential, GDP per capita in 
PPP, legal barriers to FDI 
lagged FDI inward stock 
Efficiency related 
variables 
Macroeconomic risk, GDP per capita 
in PPP, political risk, taxes, R&D 
expenditures, legal barriers to FDI 
Unit labor costs, share of low-skilled 
hours worked 
 
Thus, it Eatr ,  it Gerd ,  it Freefdi ,  t ij Ulc ,  and  t ij ls H , _  are “policy variables”, as they can be 
directly  influenced  by  policy  makers  in  the  short  run,  for  example  via  changes  in  tax  or 
competition law, public R&D expenditures, bilateral investment treaties, wage subsidies, etc.. 
At the same time  it Risk ,  it Inflation ,  it Pot  and  it GDPcap  are “intervention variables” which 
can only indirectly be influenced by policy makers and/or only in the medium to long run.  
We expect  it Pot  to have a positive impact on FDI as this variable captures market size. An 
increase in market size, ceteris paribus, should have a positive impact on marginal revenues 
and hence the profits of a firm. The sign of the coefficient of  it GDPcap  is ambiguous a priori 
(e.g. Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2007b), pointing toward its role as a “catch-all” variable: On the 
one hand this variable captures the capital abundance of a host country and, as more capital 
abundant countries should receive less capital, a negative sign should be expected (e.g.   7 
Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004). Moreover,  it GDPcap  might represent effects of wage costs on 
the  marginal  costs  of  an  FDI  (e.g.  Mutti  and  Grubert  2004),  again  implying  a  negatively 
signed coefficient. On the other hand,  it GDPcap  captures positive effects on an FDI’s profit 
level  via  a  favorable  infrastructure  endowment  (e.g.  Mutti  2004),  high  demand  and  labor 
productivity (e.g. Mutti and Grubert 2004), as well as better institutions (e.g. Bénassy-Quéré 
et al. 2007b). Thus, in principle, the host country’s GDP per capita could be substituted by 
these underlying variables. As we do not have valid proxies for each of these variables we 
have included  it GDPcap  in the empirical model. 
Unit labour costs  t ij Ulc ,  are used to capture the impact of labor productivity and wage rates 
on FDI. An increase in unit labour costs, ceteris paribus, increases marginal costs, and we 
therefore expect a negatively signed coefficient. The share of low-skilled workers,  t ij ls H , _ , 
is used as a proxy for the skill level. We opt for the share of low-skilled workers as the data 
seem to be more reliable than those on high-skilled workers, which to a large extent also 
reflect country specificities in the educational system that can blur the distinction between 
medium  and  high-skilled  workers.  Further,  in  the  manufacturing  sector  in  particular,  the 
medium educated workers (including technicians) are important for productivity performance, 
among other factors. The sign of the coefficient depends on the underlying motive for FDI, 
i.e. whether it is efficiency-seeking or market-seeking FDI. In the first case, an increase in 
t ij ls H , _   could  lead  to  an  increase  of  (vertical)  FDI  originating  in  high  skill 
countries/industries as MNEs exploit differences in factor endowments. In the second case, 
the sign should be negative, as firms duplicate plants (export substitution) and most FDI 
originates  in  high  income,  high  skill  countries  (e.g.  Barba  Navaretti  and  Venables  2004, 
chapter 2). Thus, the sign is indeterminate a priori. 
We use the change in producer prices,  it Inflation , as a proxy for macroeconomic risk, as a 
high inflation rate implies macroeconomic uncertainty. Larger uncertainty may translate into 
higher fixed costs of production, for example due to larger efforts to insure against risks of   8 
various forms or due to larger transaction costs in establishing and enforcing contracts. Thus, 
we  expect  an  increase  in  it Inflation   to  lead  to  a  decrease  in  FDI.  The  same  reasoning 
applies to the political risk level of a country  it Risk . Yet, due to the particular definition of the 
measure of  it Risk , we expect a positive coefficient. 
The  it Freefdi  variable is intended to capture legal barriers to inward FDI. In particular, this 
variable incorporates restrictions on FDI which limit the inflow of capital and thus hamper 
economic  freedom.  By  contrast,  little  or  no  restriction  of  foreign  investment  enhances 
economic freedom because foreign investment provides funds for economic expansion. For 
this factor, the more restrictions countries impose on foreign investment, the lower their level 
of economic freedom will be and the higher will be their score. Thus, a negative sign is 
expected for this variable. 
it Eatr   is  used  as  a  proxy  for  the  corporate  income  tax  burden,  as  the  after-tax  profit  is 
directly determined by the average tax rate (see Devereux and Griffith 1998: 344). Moreover, 
the  it Eatr   is  calculated  as  the  weighted  average  of  an  adjusted  statutory  tax  rate  on 
corporate income and the effective marginal tax rate (see Devereux and Griffith 1999 for 
details). Thus, it combines the effects of corporate taxes on FDI with very high levels of 
profitability and effects on marginal investments which determine the volume of an existing 
capital stock. A negatively signed coefficient is expected here, as a higher  it Eatr  implies a 
lower level of after-tax profits. 
One of the aims of the EU “Lisbon-strategy” is for the EU to become a competitive and 
dynamic science-based economic area by 2010, where an increase in the member states’ 
R&D  ratio  acts  as  an  important  policy  instrument  (e.g.  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities 2004, COM(2004) 29 final/2). In addition to this, an increase in  it Gerd , for 
example via an increase in its public component, should also have a positive impact on FDI, 
as a country’s R&D level can be considered a type of public good that makes firms more   9 
productive without causing additional costs. That is, firms may gain from positive knowledge 
spill-over effects which contribute to a higher profit level from their investment.  
Finally,  note  that  the  lagged  FDI  inward  stock,  1 , - t ij FDI ,  also  conveys  some  substantive 
meaning in addition to its role in capturing inertia. A high FDI stock in the past in a particular 
industry can be seen as a signal to potential foreign investors (“demonstration effect”; e.g. 
Barry et al. 2004). If firms seek each other’s proximity to reap industry-specific spillovers, 
making them more productive without causing additional costs, a high past FDI stock should 
also have a positive impact on the current FDI stock.
5 
Table 2 summarizes the rationale behind these variables and shows the expected sign of the 
estimated coefficients. More detailed information on the measurement of variables and data 
sources used, as well as some descriptive statistics are provided in the appendix. 
 
Table 2: Variable rationale 
Variable  Rationale  Expected Sign 
it Pot   Larger markets should experience more inward FDI. Opportunities to 
generate profits are higher.  + 
it GDPcap  
Captures positive effects of infrastructure endowment, labor 
productivity and institutions on FDI; captures negative effects of wage 
costs and a host country’s capital abundance on FDI. 
? 
it Eatr   A higher effective tax rate should decrease inward FDI, since it directly 
impacts negatively on the after-tax profit level of an FDI.  – 
it Gerd   Higher R&D expenditures in GDP should encourage inward FDI due to 
knowledge spill-over effects.  + 
it Freefdi   Higher institutional barriers to FDI imply fewer possibilities to invest. 
Opportunities to generate profits are lower.  – 
it Risk   + (due to 
measurement) 
it Inflation  
Riskier countries should receive less inward FDI, as the fixed costs of 
production are higher. 
– 
t ij ls H , _  
Depending on the motive of FDI, this variable signals either higher 
incentives to fragment production (vertical FDI) or lower possibilities to 
duplicate plants (horizontal FDI) 
? 
t ij Ulc ,   
Higher unit labor costs imply higher marginal costs and thus lower FDI.   – 
1 , - t ij FDI
 
A larger FDI stock in the past can have “demonstration effects” 
(signaling) and thus should increase current FDI stock.  + 
 
                                                            
5 Note, we refrain from including an ”agglomeration“ variable, as this would require firm level data and information 
from input-output tables to assess the vertical and horizontal linkages between firms.   10 
 
3. Methodological aspects 
3.1 Econometric methodology applied 
The empirical model shown in equ. 1 exploits variation in industry-level FDI stock data for the 
manufacturing sector (ten industries) for eleven countries and nine years. Yet, for statistical 
reasons we cannot derive industry-specific coefficients. In particular, given the relatively small 
country-industry  sample  size  and  the  dynamic  specification  applied,  estimation  of  industry-
specific coefficients is precluded as the Blundell and Bond (1998) econometric estimator used 
necessitates a relatively large cross-section (i.e. in our case many country-industry pairs). For 
the total maufacturing sector the number of pairs (about 105; cf. Table 3) is sufficient. Yet for 
the calculation of industry-specific coefficients the number would be too low.  
We apply a general-to-specific-approach as we start with the most general model (including 
all location factors shown in Table 1), the full model, and test down until only statistically 
significant  variables  remain  (at  the  10  percent  significance  level),  which  lead  us  to  the 
baseline model. This procedure is expected to reduce the possibility of an omitted variable 
bias and it also shows the robustness of our results to the inclusion and exclusion of location 
factors. Thereby, variables measured in Euros are used in logs in addition to the FDI stock. 
All other variables are used in levels. 
One advantage of using the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator is that, if there is high inertia 
in  the  dependent  variable,  it  avoids  biased  estimates  in  finite  samples  due  to  a  “weak 
instrument” problem (see Arellano 2003: 115 and Bond 2002: 20 on this issue) and it results 
in an increase in efficiency, especially if the time dimension is short. This improved efficiency 
is  the  result  of  an  exploitation  of  additional  moment  conditions.  The  validity  of  these 
conditions, however, requires mean stationarity of the initial conditions. If mean stationarity is 
not valid, the Blundell and Bond estimator will lead to inconsistent estimates (“initial condition 
bias”; Arellano 2003: 112). Thus, it is crucial to test the validity of this assumption.  
Another important advantage of the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator is that it allows us to 
specify the type of exogeneity (i.e. strictly exogenous, predetermined or endogenous) of the   11 
right hand variables. With the exception of year dummies, all variables are considered either 
predetermined (i.e.  it Eatr , 1 , - t ij FDI ,  it Freefdi ) or endogenous to FDI (all other variables). The 
endogeneity assumption for these variables is justified as it is plausible for FDI to have an 
immediate impact on GDP, labor costs, the skill level and the risk level of a country and 
industry respectively. For  it Eatr  and  it Freefdi  it is plausible for FDI to have an impact on the 
future  values  of  these  variables  only,  rendering  them  exogenous  or  predetermined.  This 
grouping of variables has an impact on the instruments used, as the lag structure of the 
instruments is adjusted accordingly. 
To avoid the problems of biased estimates (“overfitting”) and weak Hansen and Difference-
in-Sargan tests caused by too many instruments, we restrict the latter. In particular, instead 
of using all possible instruments for each available time period, we “collapse” the matrix of 
instruments.
6 Collapsing actually implies that coefficients on instruments are forced to be 
equal. This gives us a smaller set of instruments without a loss of lags and therefore also 
information  (see  Roodman  2007b:  18  for  details).  Year  dummies  are  considered  strictly 
exogenous  and  included  as  instruments  for  the  level  equation  only  to  ensure  a  correct 
number of degrees of freedom (Bond 2002). Throughout the estimation, the asymptotically 
efficient two-step GMM estimator with corrected standard errors (“Windmeijer-correction”) is 
applied. 
We generally conduct two-sided tests. However, to test the significance of the coefficients of 
those location factors for which the expected sign is a priori unambiguous we apply one-
sided tests. The alternative hypothesis in these cases is according to the expected sign (cf. 
Table 2).  
                                                            
6 Option collapse in xtabond2 is used.   12 
 
3.2 Calculation of estimated and potential FDI 
 
To calculate the potential FDI in a first step, the “best practice policy” is determined for the 
policy variables included in our analysis (that is  it Eatr ,  it Gerd  and  it Freefdi  as well as  t ij Ulc ,  
and  t ij ls H , _  the latter two being industry-specific variables) and for the most recent year 
(i.e. 2003). In our case the “best practice policy” is assumed to be either the sample mean 
(replacing the mean by the median does not change the results much) or the minimum or 
maximum value in the sample considered (cf. Table 4).  
In a second step, the “best practice policy” value is substituted for the actual value of the 
policy  variables  if  the  actual  value  can  be  improved.
7  In  a  third  step,  the  estimated 
coefficients from the baseline model are used to predict the value of FDI inward stock if the 
“best  practice  policy”  value  is  realized,  keeping  everything  else  equal,  including  the 
assumption that other countries have not improved their location factors. This predicted value 
is defined as the potential FDI stock (P). Fourth, the predicted value of the FDI stock as given 
from our baseline model is calculated. This yields the “estimated” FDI inward stock (E). The 
predicted  FDI  from  the  baseline  model  is  used  instead  of  actual  FDI  value  in  order  to 
establish a common benchmark (same data generation process) for all country-industry pairs 
against  which  changes  in  policy  variables  are  evaluated.  Moreover,  using  predicted  FDI 
allows for a direct comparison of the effects of changes in a policy factor on attracted FDI 
across country-industry-pairs, as all other conditions (including the coefficients of the data 
generation  process)  remain  constant.  Fifth,  the  quota  (Q)  of  the  estimated  (E)  and  the 
potential stock (P) is calculated, i.e. Q = (E/P*100). Thus, if the “best practice policy” were 
implemented, the potential percentage point change in FDI stock would be 100-Q.  
                                                            
7 For example, for  it Gerd  the “best practice policy” value (maximum value) is the value of FIN (3.43). This value 
is substituted for the actual values of each country-industry pair.   13 
We  calculate  two  types  of  gaps:  the  first  on  a  country  and  industry  basis  under  the 
assumption that all policy variables are set jointly at their “best practice policy” values (“total 
gap”; cf. Figures 1a and 1b). The second type of gap is calculated for each of the policy 
variables  separately,  i.e.  with  all  other  policy  variables  remaining  at  their  actual  values 
(“variable specific gaps”; cf. Figures 2a and 2b.
8 
                                                            
8 Note that the sum of the specific gaps is not equal to the total gap. Indeed, the sum of individual gaps has to be 
higher as the denominator of each individual gap is smaller in value than that of the total gap.   14 
 
4. Results  
 
4.1 Econometric analysis 
 
Table 3 presents the results of our econometric analysis with the upper part showing the “full 
model” results which contain all variables shown in Table 1. Only the short-run coefficients 
are shown, as we are interested in the impact of policy changes on FDI in the short run like 
Demekas et al. (2007).  
Despite carrying the expected signs,  it Risk  and  it Inflation fall short of statistical significance 
even when one-sided tests are applied. Political risk, in particular, is not among the relevant 
determinants of FDI. This result is plausible as the countries included are among the most 
developed market economies with a high level of political stability. Excluding  it Risk  first, as it 
has the lowest z-value, provides us  with our baseline model.
9 Note that the exclusion of 
it Risk  has only a minor impact on the estimated coefficients of the other variables. Only 
it Inflation   becomes  significant  when  applying  a  one-sided  test,  with  a  semi-elasticity  of 
about -1. This favors a weak negative impact of a higher macroeconomic risk level on FDI. 
As expected, the lagged FDI inward stock has a substantially positive impact on the current 
FDI stock. Indeed, interpreting the z-value as a rough guide for the relative importance of the 
various  variables  as  location  factors,  this  signals  that  this  variable  is  the  most  important 
determinant of current inward FDI stock. The negative sign of  it GDPcap ln  signals that more 
capital abundant countries receive less FDI. 
                                                            
9 Note that  it Risk  is kept as an instrument as this is strongly suggested by the Hansen-test for the validity of 
overidentifying restrictions. Using  it Risk  as an external instrument is justified, as on the one hand it is probably 
correlated with some of the right hand variables and on the other hand – given the results from the full model – it 
is not correlated with the error term.   15 
The coefficient of  it Pot ln , although it carries the expected sign, is rather low. Yet one should 
bear in mind that we are explaining FDI inward stocks at the industry level, whereas  it Pot ln  
is measured at the country-level. As countries with small market size may receive substantial 
parts of total world FDI in certain industries while receiving relatively few FDI in total, this low 
coefficient of  it Pot ln  is plausible.  
The semi-elasticities of  t ij ls H , _  and  t ij Ulc ,  are -0.8 and -0.6, respectively. The negative sign 
of the  t ij ls H , _  coefficient suggests that, in the countries and industries included, FDI is of a 
predominantely  horizontal  nature.  This  result  is  in  line  with  many  other  studies  (e.g. 
Markusen and Maskus 2002). A one percentage point decrease in  t ij Ulc ,  increases FDI by 
about 0.6 percent. This rather low semi-elasticity might be a further indication that most FDI 
is  horizontal  FDI,  as  market-seeking  FDI  is  probably  not  as  sensitive  to  labor  costs  as 
efficiency-seeking FDI. 
A  decrease  in  the  it Eatr   by  one  percentage  point  increases  FDI  by  about  1.9  percent 
according to the baseline model. This negative impact of the  it Eatr  on FDI is in line with 
many other studies, notably the meta-analysis carried out by DeMooij and Ederveen (2005). 
DeMooij and Ederveen (2005) find a median tax-rate elasticity of FDI of about -3. Moreover, 
Stöwhase (2005) analyzes the tax responsiveness of FDI flows into several EU countries on 
a sectoral level. Using effective tax rates to measure tax incentives, Stöwhase (2005) is able 
to  show  that  the  tax  sensitivity  of  FDI  crucially  depends  on  the  economic  sector.  While 
investment in the primary sector is driven by factors other than tax incentives, investment in 
the secondary and the tertiary sector is deterred by high tax rates. 
An increase in the  it Gerd  by one percentage point leads to an increase in the FDI inward 
stock by about 21 percent. At first sight, this value seems rather high. Yet one must consider 
that a one percentage point change marks a pronounced change in this variable, which is 
measured as percent of GDP. Evaluating the impact of  it Gerd  at the within country standard   16 
deviation (averaged over 1996–2003)
10 of about 0.14 points results in an increase in FDI of 
about 2.9 percent.  
 
Finally,  as  expected,  institutional  barriers  to  FDI  also  have  an  impact  on  inward  FDI,  as 
it Freefdi  carries a semi-elasticity of about -4.9. To summarize, our baseline model results 
are entirely plausible from an economic perspective. Moreover, the statistical tests conducted 
attest to the validity of the econometric results from a statistical point of view.
11 
                                                            
10 The xtsum command of Stata is used to get the within standard deviation of  it Gerd . 
11 As suggested by Roodman (2007b), we analyzed the robustness of our baseline model results with respect to 
different  assumptions  about  instruments.  In particular,  we  re-estimated  the  baseline  model  using  all  possible 
instruments and only lags one to three. The results do not change much. Yet, as expected, the p-values of the 
Hansen tests are inflated. These results can be provided upon request.   17 
 
Table 3: Estimation Results 
Full Model 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard error  z-value 
1 , ln - t ij FDI   0.866  0.039  22.220 
it GDPcap ln   -0.428  0.273  -1.560 
it Pot ln   0.238  0.075  3.180 
t ij ls H , _   -0.009  0.005  -1.880 
t ij Ulc ,   -0.006  0.003  -2.530 
it Eatr   -0.019  0.005  -3.770 
it Inflation   -0.010  0.008  -1.220 
it Gerd   0.198  0.086  2.300 
it Risk   0.011  0.019  0.570 
it Freefdi   -0.045  0.033  -1.370 
Cons  3.996  2.287  1.750 
AR(1): p-value  0.002       
AR(2): p-value  0.965       
Hansen_all: (DF), p-value  (72), 0.16       
Hansen_level: (DF), p-value  excluding level IV: (62), 0.20  Difference: (10), 0.25    
Hansen_dummies: (DF), p-value  excluding dummies: (65), 0.15  Difference: (7), 0.45    
Observations  779       
Number of instruments  90       
Number groups  105       
   18 
Table 3: Estimation Results (cont’d) 
Baseline model 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard error  z-value 
1 , ln - t ij FDI   0.868  0.038  22.740 
it GDPcap ln   -0.379  0.254  -1.490 
it Pot ln   0.246  0.080  3.080 
t ij ls H , _   -0.008  0.005  -1.800 
t ij Ulc ,   -0.006  0.002  -2.570 
it Eatr   -0.019  0.005  -3.860 
it Inflation   -0.011  0.008  -1.450 
it Gerd   0.206  0.089  2.310 
it Freefdi   -0.049  0.030  -1.620 
Cons  3.661  2.185  1.680 
AR(1): p-value  0.002       
AR(2): p-value  0.964       
Hansen_all: (DF), p-value  (73), 0.17       
Hansen_level: (DF), p-value  excluding level IV: (63), 0.20  Difference: (10), 0.26    
Hansen_dummies: (DF), p-value  excluding dummies: (66), 0.14  Difference: (7), 0.51    
Observations  779       
Number of instruments  90       
Number groups  105       
Notes:  “collapsed”  instrument-set  used;  AR()  =  Arellano-Bond  test  for  serial  correlation;  Hansen  represents 
overidentification  tests  of  Hansen  (J-test)  and  Difference-in-Sargan  tests  (C-test);  observations,  number  of 
instruments and groups are equal for the full and baseline models. 
 
4.2 Policy Analysis: Policies to exploit FDI potential 
 
4.2.1 Operationalisation of the “best practice policies” 
 
Table 4 shows the “best practice policy” values used for the calculation of the “total” and the 
“variable specific” gaps. We use two alternative definition of “best practice policy” values: (i) 
sample means and (ii) sample minima or maxima from the year 2003. We prefer the sample 
means, as it is rather unlikely that location factors would tend to extreme values. A gradual 
change seems more plausible in the countries concerned.  
Before  presenting  the  derived  “total”  and  “variable  specific”  gaps  we  will  briefly  discuss 
country-specific  deviations  from  the  sample  means  and  from  minima  or  maxima  for  the 
respective variables.   19 
Table 4: “Best Practice Policy” values of location factors averaged across countries 
Sample means 
Industry  t ij Ulc ,   t ij ls H , _   it Gerd   it Eatr   it Freefdi  
DA  51.67  22.84  2.23  25.96  2.00 
DB  58.09  24.44  2.23  25.96  2.00 
DD_DE  53.73  18.73  2.23  25.96  2.00 
DF  34.97  17.85  2.23  25.96  2.00 
DG  44.36  17.70  2.23  25.96  2.00 
DH  54.42  18.83  2.23  25.96  2.00 
DJ  57.96  18.88  2.23  25.96  2.00 
DK  63.16  15.51  2.23  25.96  2.00 
DL  60.25  14.28  2.23  25.96  2.00 
DM  54.99  14.58  2.23  25.96  2.00 
 
Table 4: “Best Practice Policy” values of location factors averaged across countries (cont’d) 
Minimum and Maximum values 
Industry  t ij Ulc ,   t ij ls H , _   it Gerd   it Eatr   it Freefdi  
DA  22.89  7.85  3.43  17.11  1.00 
DB  36.39  7.85  3.43  17.11  1.00 
DD_DE  24.21  7.23  3.43  17.11  1.00 
DF  10.95  7.23  3.43  17.11  1.00 
DG  18.99  6.60  3.43  17.11  1.00 
DH  22.46  7.23  3.43  17.11  1.00 
DJ  24.24  7.23  3.43  17.11  1.00 
DK  29.84  4.29  3.43  17.11  1.00 
DL  25.43  4.29  3.43  17.11  1.00 
DM  17.78  4.29  3.43  17.11  1.00 
 
With  respect  to  sample  means,  Germany,  the  US,  Austria  and  the  Netherlands  reflect 
particularly large deviations in the  it Eatr , while countries like the Slovak Republic, Great 
Britain or Hungary are countries exhibiting a “best practice tax policy”. Concerning  it Gerd , a 
clear  differentiation  between  old  and  new  EU  member  states  (as  of  2004)  is  discernible 
where  the  deviation  is  particularly  large  for  the  Slovak  Republic  and  Hungary.  These 
countries may wish to prioritize R&D policy over the improvement of other location factors. 
The  picture  is  the  opposite  for  t ij Ulc , ,  as  labor-cost  saving  measures  and  productivity-
enhancing measures would have the largest impact on FDI for Finland, Great Britain and the 
Netherlands. Hungary, Slovenia and the US are in a much more favorable position. It is 
interesting  to  note  that  this  does  not  apply  to  particular  industries  in  these  countries.   20 
Reducing the share of low-skilled employees ( t ij ls H , _ ) should be effective for attracting FDI 
in Slovenia, Germany, Austria and France, but would have a negligible impact for the other 
countries in the sample. It would only be possible to increase FDI through the abolishment or 
reduction of FDI-specific regulations ( it Freefdi ) in Slovenia and France. 
When referring to the minimum and maximum values, Hungary is the for  it Eatr . Germany, 
the  US,  the  Netherlands  and  Austria  are  at  the  upper  end,  whereas Slovenia  and  Great 
Britain are at the lower end. With respect to  it Gerd , Finland sets the “best practice policy” 
value. Not unexpectedly, the CEEC-4 (Hungary, the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic, 
and  Slovenia)  show  the  largest  deviations,  followed  by  a  group  of  older  EU  countries: 
Austria, the Netherlands and Great Britain. On the lower end, i.e. showing small deviations, 
again not surprisingly we find the US, Germany and France. For unit labour costs ( t ij Ulc , ) the 
Slovak Republic becomes the benchmark country. On the top end there is no clear clustering 
of countries, but rather varied industry-country pairs. Yet the CEEC-4 are clearly clustered at 
the lower end. With  t ij ls H , _ the Slovak Republic is the benchmark country. Most Slovene 
industries can be found at the top end (i.e. large deviation), but these are mixed with single 
industries of the old EU countries and the US. Seven out of the 13 industries with the largest 
deviations refer to Textiles and Wearing Apparel (DB). The industries of the Netherlands are 
clustered at the lower end. With respect to  it Freefdi , the Netherlands and Germany are the 
benchmark  countries.  Removing  obstacles to  cross-border  FDI  in  the form  of  regulations 
would primarily increase FDI in Slovenia and France. 
 
4.2.2 Total and variable specific gaps 
 
Figures 1a and 1b present the “total gaps” separated by countries and industries based on 
sample  means  as  the  “best  practice  policy”  values.  The  gaps  are  highest  in  the  Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia, ranging from 3.5 to almost 7 percent. Hence, these two countries 
could  attract  much  more  FDI  if  all  location  factors  tended  toward  the  sample  means.   21 
However,  a  closer  look  at  the  particular  countries  reveals  that  the  gaps  in  the  Slovak 
Republic  are  only  caused  by  the  lack  of  R&D  expenditures  ( it Gerd ).  In  Slovenia,  the 
relatively  high  share  of  low-skilled  workers  t ij ls H , _ –  with  particularly  high  gaps  in  the 
technology  intensive  industries  Machinery  and equipment (DK),  Electrical  machinery  (DL) 
and Transport Equipment (DM) – and the variable capturing the barriers to FDI ( it Freefdi ) 
are also important (see appendix Table B2.1). In the remaining two CEECs, i.e. the Czech 
Republic  and  Hungary,  the  gaps  of  around  two  and  three  percent  respectively  are  quite 
similar across industries. Again it is interesting to note that the gaps are mainly caused by a 
lack  of  R&D  expenditures  (i.e.  a  low  value  of  variable  it Gerd ).  Taxes  ( it Eatr )  are  only 
additionally relevant in the Czech Republic. 
With respect to the US-plus-EU-6 economies, Austria, the Netherlands and the US are on 
the lower end,  with the gaps ranging between one and two percent. However, there are 
some industry-specific patterns: In Austria the gaps are relatively large in the Food (DA), 
Chemicals  (DG)  and  Rubber  and  Plastic  products  (DH)  industries,  whereas  in  the 
Netherlands the gaps are relatively low in the Food (DA), Coke (DF) and Chemicals (DG) 
industries. In the other industries the gaps are above two percent with a value of as much as 
four percent in the Electrical machinery (DL) industry. The pattern in the US is similar, as we 
only  find  spikes  in  the  Textiles  (DB)  industry,  partly  caused  by  the  share  of  low-skilled 
workers, and in the Motor vehicles (DM) industry, mainly caused by high unit labour costs 
( t ij Ulc , ). 
The gaps in the remaining countries are higher, with Germany exhibiting the largest gaps of 
between four and five percent. The gaps in France range in between two and three percent 
with low variation across industries. For Great Britain and Finland we find gaps of about two 
percent with some large differences, especially for the Coke (DF) industry in Great Britain 
and the Textiles and wearing apparel (DB) industry in Finland.    22 
Figure 1a: “Total gap” between estimated and potential FDI per country and industry: US-
























DA DB DD_DE DF DG DH DJ DK DL DM
 
 
Figure 1b: “Total gap” between estimated and potential FDI per country and industry: CEEC-
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Table 5: Country averages across industries by educational intensity (2003) 
   Sample Means  Min - Max 












AUT  1.34  1.56  10.64  12.03 
FIN  2.23  3.22  7.98  10.18 
FRA  2.57  2.95  10.27  11.53 
GBR  2.66  2.17  10.61  10.35 
GER   3.84  4.39  10.24  11.93 
NLD  2.03  2.08  8.97  9.51 
USA  1.47  1.55  6.44  7.50 
CZE   2.19  2.20  10.12  9.98 
HUN   2.85  3.08  8.41  10.29 
SVK  4.82  4.94  12.29  12.48 
SVN  4.56  3.89  14.83  15.39 
Average  2.78  2.91  10.07  11.02 
Note: High education intensive industries: DG, DF, DL, DK, DM; low education intensive industries: DA, DB, DE, 
DD, DJ, DH 
 
From a policy perspective a country might wish to attract FDI in particular industries, e.g. in 
higher  tech  or  skill-intensive  industries.  Table  5  thus  presents  country  averages  by 
educational intensity, separated into high- and low-educational intensity which is an indicator 
of skill-intensity by industry.
12 The first group might also be referred to as medium-to-high 
tech industries. In eight countries the gap in low educational intensive industries is larger 
than  in  the  high  educational  intensive  industries  (the  exceptions  are  the  Netherlands, 
Slovenia and the US). In this table we also present the “total gap” with respect to country and 
industry-specific minima and maxima. These calculations reveal that the gaps are about five 
times larger compared to when we use the sample means. Among these countries Slovenia 
shows the largest gap. From a policy perspective there is no discernable industry clustering, 
which  implies  that  there  is  little  room  for  structural  policies  (e.g.  affecting  those  location 
                                                            
12 The justification for separating industries by educational intensity stems from the fact that “educational intensity 
is an important measure of the productive capabilities available in the human resource base of an economy. 
Although such evidence is naturally based on the individual characteristics of the people occupying the jobs, it 
also  reflects  the  labor  skill  requirements  of  firms  …”.  (Peneder  2007,  p.  190)  The  following  industries  are 
classified as high education intensity industries: DG, DF, DL, DK, DM, while the following are classified as low 
education intensity industries: DA, DB, DE, DD, DJ, DH.   24 
factors  which  benefit  a  particular  industry  with  certain  characteristics)  given  the  set  of 
variables which turned out to be significant in our estimations. 
Finally, let us turn to the “variable specific” gaps. Figures 2a and 2b present these gaps. The 
scenario is again to set the specific variables to the sample means which represent the “best 
practice policy” values. 
Within the US-plus-EU-6 countries, taxes ( it Eatr ) dominate the picture in Germany and the 
US, and to a lesser extent in Austria and the Netherlands (cf. Figure 2a). Relatively low R&D 
expenditures ( it Gerd ) only matter in Great Britain and the Netherlands; all other countries 
are  above  the  sample  means.  Note  however,  that  this  sample  means  also  includes  the 
CEEC-4. High unit labour costs mainly play a role in Finland, Germany and Great Britain 
(where this variable explains most of the gap). The relatively high share of workers having 
only low educational levels makes a difference in Austria, Finland, France and Germany. 
Finally, barriers to FDI ( it Freefdi ) are only relevant in France.  
 
Figure 2a: Mean “variable specific gap” by policy factor and country (evaluated at the sample 
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Notes: If an indicator is missing, this means that the country reflects the „”best practice policy“ value or better. 
Means are taken over industries.   25 
This pattern changes when looking at the Eastern European economies which have gaps 
mainly with respect to  it Gerd  (cf. Figure 2b). The high share of low educated workers makes 
a  big  difference  in  Slovenia  but  only  a  small  difference  in  Hungary.  it Eatr   is  somewhat 
important in the Czech Republic, whereas in Slovenia a reduction of barriers to FDI would 
attract FDI.  
 
Figure 2b: Mean “variable specific gap” by policy factor and country (evaluated at the sample 
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Notes: If an indicator is missing, this means that the country reflects the „”best practice policy“ value or better. 
Means are taken over industries. 
 
5. Summary and Policy Conclusions 
 
The  purpose  of this  paper  was,  first,  to  provide  information  on  promising fields  of  policy 
intervention when the goal is to attract additional FDI and, second, to provide insight on the 
scope of FDI that can be attracted if a “best practice policy” is implemented. The results 
show  how  different  policy  variables  contribute  to  closing  the  gap  between  actual  and 
potential FDI.   26 
Let us finally discuss the policy conclusion we can draw from the econometric analysis and 
the evaluation of existing gaps. It is important to bear in mind that the interpretation of our 
estimates is subject to the ceteris paribus condition.  
While  the  econometric  analysis  suggests  that  increasing  the  it Gerd   in  US-plus-EU-6 
economies would attract more FDI, the analysis of the gaps reveals that these countries may 
gain more from improvements of other policy variables. Therefore, policies in the US-plus-
EU-6 should focus on lowering taxes and improving their unit labour cost position. Changes 
in unit labour costs might be achieved via productivity effects, e.g. resulting from lowering the 
share of unskilled workers, as larger wage reduction might not be a viable policy option. 
Thus,  policies  in  these  countries  should  focus  on  research  and  development  and  the 
education and training of workers.  
For the CEEC-4 not much can be gained (in relative terms) from a further lowering of taxes 
as  the  largest  gaps  arise  from  deficiencies  in  the  it Gerd   (and  thus  research  and 
development  in  general).  Instead,  policies  should  strive  to  increase  the  share  of  higher 
educated workers as this is relatively low compared to that of the US-plus-EU-6 economies.  
Our analysis has revealed that the two groups of countries in our sample need to focus on 
different location factors if the gaps are to be closed. Within each group, there is of course 
some  country  heterogeneity,  as  shown  in  Figures  2a  and  2b,  which  requires  a  country-
specific differentiation of FDI policies. However, as in any other field of economic policy, FDI 
policy measures are subject to a number of restrictions. In particular, the budgetary effects of 
policy changes should be considered. As it is unlikely that all location factors in a country will 
improve simultaneously, this paper provides important information on the role of individual 
location factors and their impact on FDI.  
   27 
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Appendix A. Data availability, classifications and correspondences 
This appendix covers only those countries for which usable FDI data are available at an industry level. 
Initially we also checked other countries, but found the data for these to be insufficient, either because 
there were no data for FDI stocks or because key explanatory variables were missing. The resulting 
country list is as follows: Austria (AUT), the Czech Republic (CZE), France (FRA), Finland (FIN), Great 
Britain (GBR), Germany (GER), Hungary (HUN), the Netherlands (NLD), Slovenia (SVN), the Slovak 
Republic (SVK) and the United States of America (USA). 
 
A.1. Dependent variable: Industry-level FDI stocks 
Data for FDI inward stocks are mainly taken from the OECD IDI database. This database provides 
data either in US-$ or in 'submitted currency' (the latter corresponds in all cases to the respective 
national currency, with the exception of Poland). The classification of industries is according to ISIC 
revision 3, which also corresponds to NACE revision 1 (15-37). These are listed in table A.1.1 below. 
In this table we also show the correspondence to the recently released EU KLEMS database from 
which  some  of  the  explanatory  variables  are  taken.  The  industry  classification  in  the  EU  KLEMS 
database is derived from the NACE revision 1 classification. The descriptions of industries according 
to the NACE or ISIC classification respectively, are presented in Table A.1.2. FDI data for the CEEC-4 
are taken from the wiiw FDI database (see www.wiiw.org) which reports industry-level data at the 
NACE level. Note that for both 15-37 and DA-DN classification the scope differs across countries. 
 
Table A1.1  Industry correspondences  
Number  Description (in OECD IDI)  ISIC rev. 3  NACE rev. 1  EUKLEMS 
01  Food products  15,16  DA  15t16 
02  Textiles and wearing apparel  17,18  DB  17t18 
03  Wood, publishing and printing  20, 21, 22  DD, DE  20,21t22 
04  Total (02+03)       
05  Refined petroleum and other treatments  23  DF  23 
06  Chemical products  24  DG  24 
07  Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and 
botanical products 
     
08  Rubber and plastic products  25  DH  25 
09  Total (05+06+08)       
10  Metal products  27, 28  DJ  27t28 
11  Mechanical products  29  DK  29 
12  Total (10+11)       
13  Office machinery and computers  30  DL  30t33 
14  Radio, TV, communication equipment  32     
15  Total (13+14)       
16 
Medical precision and optical instruments, 
watches and clocks 
33     
17  Motor vehicles  34     
18  Other transport equipment  35     
19  Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft       
20  Total (17+18)    DM  34t35 
21  Other manufacturing  36, 37       30 
Table A1.2  Industry aggregates (NACE rev. 1 and ISIC rev. 3) 
Industry code 
NACE rev. 1 
Industry 
code 
ISIC rev. 3 
Description 
D  D  Total manufacturing 
15  DA  Food products and beverages 
16  DA  Tobacco products 
17  DB  Textiles 
18  DB  Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur 
19  DC 
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, 
saddlery, harness and footwear 
20  DD  Wood and products of wood and cork 
21  DE  Paper and paper products;  
22    Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 
23  DF  Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
24  DG  Chemicals and chemical products 
25  DH  Rubber and plastic products 
26  DI  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
27  DJ  Basic metals 
28  DJ  Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
29  DK  Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 
30  DL  Office, accounting and computing machinery 
31  DL  Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 
32  DL  Radio, television and communication equipment 
33  DL  Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
34  DM  Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
35  DM  Other transport equipment 
36  DN  Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 
37  DN  Recycling 
 
A.1.1  OECD IDI Database 
A general problem when combining data from the OECD IDI with other industry-level data is that data 
on 'Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks' (NACE revision 1 code 33 and 
belonging to NACE DL) are missing in most countries or only included at the very end of the period 
reported  in  the  OECD  IDI  database.  This  leads  to  larger  deviations  between  data  reported  in  the 
OECD IDI and the wiiw FDI database used for CEEC-4 (see details below). Consequently, data for 
industry DL are not strictly comparable across countries. They are, however, relatively consistent over 
time. In some cases the OECD IDI database reports negative values for FDI inward stocks. These 
values are omitted in the analysis when taking logarithms. The following paragraphs describe the data 
set used in more detail by country: 
   31 
Austria  
'Refined petroleum and other treatments' was missing in 2003 and was replaced by extrapolation. The 
FDI inward stock almost doubled in 2002; 'Office machinery and equipment' was missing in 1996 and 
was replaced by linear extrapolation; entries in 'Radio, TV and communication equipment' are negative 
in 1997 and 1998; entries in 'Other transport equipment' are negative in the period 1997 to 2000. 
 
Finland 
Data for 'Textiles and wearing apparel' and 'Wood, publishing and printing' are linearly interpolated for 
2000-2002. Data are either not available or only available for 2003 and 2004 for 'Refined petroleum 
and other treatments', 'Rubber and plastic products', 'Office machinery and computers', and 'Radio, 
TV, and communication equipment', 'Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks', 
'Motor vehicles', 'Other transport equipments'; data for some subaggregates available; negative values 
appear in 1998. 
 
Great Britain 
Data for 'Refined petroleum and other treatments' are interpolated in 1997 and 1998 and extrapolated 
for 2003; 'Rubber and plastic products' is calculated as difference to the subtotal provided. 
 
France, Germany, Netherlands 
No adjustments were made. 
 
USA 
The subtotal for 'Textiles and wearing apparel' and 'Wood, publishing and printing' is recalculated as it 
originally also includes 'Food products'; the subtotals for chemical sector and metal and machinery 
sector are calculated from detailed industry data; industry 'Medical, precision and optical instruments, 
watches and clocks' is only available from 2002. 
 
A.1.2  WIIW Database 
For CEEC-4 (CZE, HUN, SVK, SVN) we relied on the 'wiiw Database on Foreign Direct Investment 
2007', the reason being the higher reliability and the longer period covered for most countries. This 
database provides FDI inward stocks in the manufacturing at the NACE 2-digit level in either codes 
15-37 or letter codes DA-DN up to 2006. We only consider the period up to 2003 to be consistent with 




Period covered is 1997-2003; data in OECD IDI and wiiw FDI database are almost identical (some 
smaller deviations  in some  years), the only  exception being  industry DL as  in the latter  database 
'Medical precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks' (33) are missing; however, differences 
become smaller over time. 
   32 
Hungary 
The period covered is 1998-2003; the data in the OECD IDI and wiiw FDI are almost identical from 
2001 onwards; before 2001, the data in the OECD IDI are missing in 1999 and 2000 and seem to be 
unreliable from 1995-1998 in the OECD IDI database (a large jump is reported between 1998 and 
1999); larger  deviations are found in industry DL as in the latter database 'Medical precision and 




The period covered is 1996-2003. 
 
Slovenia 
The period covered is 1995-2003; data are missing for industry DF due to confidentiality. 
 
Using  this  information  one  is  left  with  data  on  FDI  inward  stocks  for  eleven  countries  and  ten 
industries.  The  time  period  covered  is  1995-2003  (although  for  some  countries  not  all  years  are 
available); with respect to industry detail we distinguish ten industries within the manufacturing sector: 
Food products (DA), Textiles and Wearing Apparel (DB), Wood and paper products (DD_DE), Coke 
and Petroleum (DF), Chemicals and chemical products (DG), Rubber and plastic products (DH), Basic 
and fabricated metal products (DJ), Machinery and equipment (DK), Electrical machinery (DL), and 
Motor vehicles and transport equipment (DM).
13 
 
A2. Explanatory variables  
 
A2.1. Industry-level data 
Data at the industry level are calculated using the EU KLEMS database (see www.euklems.org and 
Timmer et al. 2007). Unit labour costs have been calculated as ((COMP/EXRavg) / (H_EMPE) / ((VA / 
PPP_15) / H_EMP) where COMP denotes “compensation of employees” (in millions of local currency), 
VA is “gross value added” at current basic prices (in millions of local currency); H_EMP and H_EMPE 
denote “total hours worked” by persons engaged (millions) and “total hours worked” by employees 
(millions) respectively. In addition to this, the share of low educated workers was calculated, provided 
the information was available in this database.  
 
A2.2. Macro data 
Macro data are briefly described in Table A.2.1. 
 
                                                            
13 Note that Poland has not been included in the sample as it receives comparably few FDI in per capita terms in 
the manufacturing sector. Thus, it would be an outlier in our sample.   33 
Table A2.1  Explanatory variables: description and sources 
Abbreviation  Definition  Source 
it Eatr   Effective average tax rate (in percent) 
Own calculations based on Devereux and Griffith 
1999; assumptions follow Devereux and Griffith; pre-
tax financial flow of 20%; only corporate income taxes 
are considered; raw tax data are taken from the 
European Tax Handbook and KPMG’s Corporate Tax 
Rate Surveys; 
it Gerd   Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D 
(in percent of GDP) 
OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators 
download; 
it Risk   Political risk ( 0 = high; 25 = low)  Euromoney 
it Freefdi   Barriers to FDI (1 = very low; 5 = very high)
14  The Heritage Foundation 
it Inflation   Producer prices in manufacturing sector 
(annual change over previous year) 
WIIW online database for several CEECs and OECD 
Main economic indicators database 
it Pot   Own market potential (in logarithm) 
Eurostat: New Cronos database; CEPII internal 
distance measures: 
http://www.cepii.org/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.html 




                                                            
14 Data on  it Freefdi  are missing for Finland, Netherlands and Slovenia for 1995 and have been replaced with 
values of 1996.   34 
Appendix B. Figures and Tables 
 
B1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table B1.1  Means, Standard Deviation, Minima and Maxima  
Variable    Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
t ij FDI , ln   Overall  7.20  1.98  0.74  11.89 
  Between    1.91  3.07  11.50 
  Within    0.48  4.31  9.46 
1 , ln - t ij FDI   Overall  7.06  2.02  0.64  11.89 
  Between    1.96  1.94  11.42 
  Within    0.50  4.39  10.43 
it GDPcap ln   Overall  9.89  0.34  9.10  10.41 
  Between    0.34  9.24  10.31 
  Within    0.10  9.66  10.06 
it Pot ln   Overall  7.63  1.31  5.43  9.18 
  Between    1.32  5.60  9.11 
  Within    0.14  7.25  7.89 
t ij ls H , _   Overall  20.18  8.83  4.29  40.50 
  Between    8.62  6.21  34.84 
  Within    1.59  14.37  26.68 
t ij Ulc ,  
Overall  57.24  23.38  -29.71  113.42 
  Between     23.46  4.85  99.80 
  Within     5.75  22.67  91.67 
it Eatr   Overall  27.70  5.74  17.11  38.27 
  Between    5.49  17.36  36.08 
  Within    2.23  19.77  34.94 
it Inflation   Overall  1.99  3.18  -2.68  11.60 
  Between     2.07  -0.31  5.69 
  Within     2.44  -4.83  11.43 
it Gerd   Overall  1.85  0.67  0.57  3.43 
  Between     0.68  0.70  3.08 
  Within     0.13  1.28  2.21 
it Freefdi   Overall  2.16  0.56  1.00  4.00 
  Between     0.44  1.63  3.00 
  Within     0.32  1.28  3.28 
it Risk   Overall  21.78  3.86  12.32  25.00 
  Between     3.90  13.81  24.71 
  Within     0.70  19.78  24.14 






   35 
Table B1.2  Correlation Matrix of explanatory variables 




This section displays the gaps calculated according to the description in the main text. The “gap” has 
been defined as 100 minus the “quota”. The quota is derived as the ratio of the fitted values over the 
FDI potential. The calculation of the FDI potential has been described in section 4 and depends on a 
benchmark, which is either the sample means (cf. Table B2.1) or the minimum and maximum value 
(Table B2.2) of the respective indicator across all industry-country pairs. Thus, the FDI potential can 
easily be calculated from the information provided in these tables. 
 
Table B2.1  Gaps based on Sample Means, 2003, by policy variables 
Country  Industry  EATR  GERD  ULC  H_LS  FREEFDI  All variables 
AUT  DA  0.58  0.00  1.53  0.69  0.00  2.76 
  DB  0.70  0.00  0.00  0.59  0.00  1.28 
  DD_DE  0.56  0.00  0.00  0.44  0.00  0.99 
  DF  0.55  0.00  0.00  0.54  0.00  1.08 
  DG  0.51  0.00  1.08  0.52  0.00  2.08 
  DH  0.70  0.00  0.50  0.54  0.00  1.72 
  DJ  0.60  0.00  0.00  0.46  0.00  1.05 
  DK  0.56  0.00  0.32  0.33  0.00  1.20 
  DL  0.53  0.00  0.25  0.45  0.00  1.22 
  DM  0.62  0.00  0.00  0.49  0.00  1.10 
CZE  DA  0.35  1.71  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.05 
  DB  0.42  2.06  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.46 
  DD_DE  0.37  1.83  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.19 
  DF  0.44  2.16  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.58 
  DG  0.37  1.81  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.16 
  DH  0.37  1.84  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.20 
  DJ  0.36  1.78  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.13 
  DK  0.38  1.89  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.26 
  DL  0.34  1.68  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.01 
  DM  0.33  1.63  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.96 
FIN  DA  0.00  0.00  1.51  0.82  0.00  2.30 
  DB  0.00  0.00  5.90  1.20  0.00  6.96 
  DD_DE  0.00  0.00  0.72  0.79  0.00  1.50 
  
1 , ln - t ij FDI   it GDPcap ln   it Pot ln   t ij ls H , _   t ij Ulc ,
  it Eatr   it Inflation   it Gerd   it Freefdi   it Risk  
1 , ln - t ij FDI   1.00                            
it GDPcap ln   0.70  1.00                         
it Pot ln   0.78  0.83  1.00                      
t ij ls H , _   -0.14  0.16  0.11  1.00                   
t ij Ulc ,  
0.37  0.67  0.67  0.38  1.00                
it Eatr   0.37  0.35  0.54  -0.13  0.21  1.00             
it Inflation   -0.40  -0.50  -0.49  -0.18  -0.45  -0.32  1.00          
it Gerd   0.55  0.82  0.63  0.37  0.66  0.36  -0.49  1.00       
it Freefdi   -0.31  -0.39  -0.35  0.18  -0.18  -0.18  0.24  -0.21  1.00    
it Risk   0.69  0.93  0.88  0.28  0.76  0.35  -0.57  0.81  -0.35  1.00 
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  DF             
  DG  0.00  0.00  1.23  0.87  0.00  2.08 
  DH             
  DJ  0.00  0.00  1.36  0.77  0.00  2.11 
  DK  0.00  0.00  2.18  0.20  0.00  2.37 
  DL             
  DM             
FRA  DA  0.26  0.00  1.37  0.81  0.57  2.94 
  DB  0.32  0.00  0.53  0.82  0.71  2.34 
  DD_DE  0.27  0.00  1.68  0.93  0.61  3.40 
  DF  0.27  0.00  0.30  1.00  0.60  2.13 
  DG  0.23  0.00  0.99  0.85  0.50  2.53 
  DH  0.28  0.00  1.18  0.95  0.63  2.98 
  DJ  0.26  0.00  1.45  0.87  0.58  3.09 
  DK  0.26  0.00  1.38  0.65  0.59  2.83 
  DL  0.25  0.00  1.68  0.74  0.57  3.17 
  DM  0.24  0.00  0.77  0.68  0.54  2.20 
GBR  DA  0.00  0.18  1.03  0.00  0.00  1.21 
  DB  0.00  0.22  2.28  0.40  0.00  2.88 
  DD_DE  0.00  0.18  1.56  0.00  0.00  1.73 
  DF  0.00  0.31  6.07  0.00  0.00  6.33 
  DG  0.00  0.17  1.45  0.00  0.00  1.61 
  DH  0.00  0.21  2.22  0.00  0.00  2.42 
  DJ  0.00  0.20  2.42  0.00  0.00  2.61 
  DK  0.00  0.19  1.34  0.00  0.00  1.52 
  DL  0.00  0.18  1.54  0.00  0.00  1.71 
  DM  0.00  0.18  1.95  0.00  0.00  2.12 
GER  DA  2.00  0.00  2.02  1.22  0.00  5.07 
  DB  2.26  0.00  1.16  1.18  0.00  4.48 
  DD_DE  2.00  0.00  1.11  1.07  0.00  4.08 
  DF  2.05  0.00  0.86  1.20  0.00  4.01 
  DG  1.57  0.00  1.41  0.92  0.00  3.80 
  DH  1.81  0.00  1.32  0.96  0.00  3.99 
  DJ  1.94  0.00  1.53  1.02  0.00  4.36 
  DK  1.74  0.00  1.43  1.23  0.00  4.27 
  DL  1.61  0.00  1.65  0.41  0.00  3.60 
  DM  1.62  0.00  1.57  0.39  0.00  3.51 
HUN  DA  0.00  2.51  0.00  0.44  0.00  2.93 
  DB  0.00  3.32  0.00  0.35  0.00  3.65 
  DD_DE  0.00  2.89  0.00  0.02  0.00  2.92 
  DF             
  DG  0.00  2.52  0.00  0.13  0.00  2.65 
  DH  0.00  2.93  0.00  0.01  0.00  2.94 
  DJ  0.00  2.94  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.94 
  DK  0.00  2.77  0.00  0.40  0.00  3.15 
  DL  0.00  2.40  0.00  0.47  0.00  2.85 
  DM  0.00  2.35  0.00  0.43  0.00  2.76 
NLD  DA  0.65  0.25  0.23  0.00  0.00  1.12 
  DB  0.89  0.35  1.05  0.00  0.00  2.25 
  DD_DE  0.70  0.27  1.07  0.00  0.00  2.01 
  DF  0.66  0.26  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.92 
  DG  0.60  0.24  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.84 
  DH  0.66  0.26  1.46  0.00  0.00  2.35 
  DJ  0.74  0.29  1.64  0.00  0.00  2.64 
  DK  0.79  0.31  1.23  0.00  0.00  2.30   37 
  DL  0.69  0.27  3.35  0.00  0.00  4.25 
  DM  0.78  0.30  0.80  0.00  0.00  1.86 
SVK  DA  0.00  4.29  0.00  0.00  0.00  4.29 
  DB  0.00  6.54  0.00  0.00  0.00  6.54 
  DD_DE  0.00  4.76  0.00  0.00  0.00  4.76 
  DF  0.00  4.70  0.00  0.00  0.00  4.70 
  DG  0.00  4.74  0.00  0.00  0.00  4.74 
  DH  0.00  5.37  0.00  0.00  0.00  5.37 
  DJ  0.00  3.72  0.00  0.00  0.00  3.72 
  DK  0.00  4.99  0.00  0.00  0.00  4.99 
  DL  0.00  4.85  0.00  0.00  0.00  4.85 
  DM  0.00  4.85  0.00  0.00  0.00  4.85 
SVN  DA  0.00  2.50  0.00  0.35  1.09  3.86 
  DB  0.00  2.90  0.00  0.07  1.27  4.16 
  DD_DE  0.00  2.03  0.00  0.73  0.88  3.56 
  DF             
  DG  0.00  1.81  0.00  0.78  0.78  3.30 
  DH  0.00  2.12  0.00  0.75  0.92  3.70 
  DJ  0.00  2.40  0.00  0.84  1.04  4.18 
  DK  0.00  2.22  0.00  1.46  0.96  4.51 
  DL  0.00  2.29  0.00  1.71  0.99  4.83 
  DM  0.00  2.68  0.00  1.95  1.17  5.59 
USA  DA  1.30  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.30 
  DB  1.68  0.00  0.00  0.82  0.00  2.47 
  DD_DE  1.38  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.38 
  DF  1.30  0.00  0.47  0.00  0.00  1.76 
  DG  1.15  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.15 
  DH  1.26  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.26 
  DJ  1.35  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.35 
  DK  1.19  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.19 
  DL  1.25  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.25 
  DM  1.23  0.00  0.79  0.00  0.00  2.00 
Note: For industries in bold letters no FDI data are available for the year 2003 
 
Table B2.2  Gaps based on Sample Minima and Maxima, 2003, by policy variables 
Country  industry  EATR  GERD  ULC  H_LS  FREEFDI  All variables 
AUT  DA  3.03  3.55  4.06  2.46  0.73  12.50 
  DB  3.59  4.21  2.35  2.92  0.87  12.59 
  DD_DE  2.89  3.39  2.55  1.75  0.69  10.38 
  DF  2.86  3.35  2.06  1.73  0.69  9.88 
  DG  2.68  3.14  3.07  1.68  0.64  10.32 
  DH  3.60  4.22  3.90  2.19  0.87  13.28 
  DJ  3.11  3.64  3.11  1.88  0.75  11.40 
  DK  2.90  3.41  3.18  1.62  0.70  10.83 
  DL  2.73  3.20  3.06  1.52  0.65  10.30 
  DM  3.20  3.76  3.53  1.79  0.77  11.88 
CZE  DA  2.58  5.72  0.00  0.50  0.66  9.00 
  DB  3.10  6.82  0.00  0.61  0.80  10.66 
  DD_DE  2.76  6.11  1.14  0.49  0.71  10.48 
  DF  3.25  7.15  1.17  0.58  0.84  12.03 
  DG  2.73  6.04  0.23  0.56  0.70  9.69 
  DH  2.78  6.14  0.18  0.49  0.71  9.74 
  DJ  2.69  5.95  0.89  0.48  0.69  10.03 
  DK  2.85  6.30  0.80  0.42  0.73  10.42   38 
  DL  2.54  5.64  0.72  0.37  0.65  9.37 
  DM  2.47  5.48  0.67  0.36  0.63  9.10 
FIN  DA  1.69  0.00  3.70  2.35  0.63  7.92 
  DB  3.07  0.00  9.80  4.23  1.15  16.39 
  DD_DE  1.90  0.00  3.48  2.11  0.71  7.75 
  DF             
  DG  1.83  0.00  3.33  2.10  0.68  7.52 
  DH             
  DJ  1.91  0.00  4.47  2.12  0.71  8.67 
  DK  1.85  0.00  4.89  1.47  0.69  8.43 
  DL             
  DM             
FRA  DA  2.19  2.94  3.36  2.19  1.13  10.83 
  DB  2.72  3.65  3.26  2.72  1.41  12.42 
  DD_DE  2.33  3.12  4.01  2.06  1.21  11.59 
  DF  2.29  3.08  2.54  2.03  1.19  10.24 
  DG  1.94  2.60  2.56  1.76  1.00  9.16 
  DH  2.42  3.24  3.63  2.14  1.25  11.54 
  DJ  2.23  2.99  4.00  1.97  1.16  11.28 
  DK  2.26  3.04  3.75  1.73  1.17  10.95 
  DL  2.18  2.92  4.05  1.66  1.13  10.94 
  DM  2.08  2.79  3.34  1.59  1.08  10.04 
GBR  DA  1.54  3.47  2.87  1.01  0.52  8.82 
  DB  1.88  4.21  4.65  2.12  0.64  12.28 
  DD_DE  1.51  3.39  3.52  0.81  0.51  9.10 
  DF  2.55  5.67  8.95  0.58  0.87  16.61 
  DG  1.44  3.24  2.95  0.38  0.49  8.01 
  DH  1.77  3.97  4.50  0.72  0.60  10.70 
  DJ  1.67  3.75  4.86  0.92  0.56  10.86 
  DK  1.61  3.61  3.53  0.94  0.54  9.53 
  DL  1.52  3.42  3.70  0.70  0.51  9.22 
  DM  1.48  3.34  4.28  0.80  0.50  9.70 
GER  DA  4.15  2.45  4.28  2.80  0.00  12.43 
  DB  4.68  2.76  3.97  3.16  0.00  13.15 
  DD_DE  4.15  2.45  3.65  2.29  0.00  11.49 
  DF  4.25  2.51  3.36  2.35  0.00  11.42 
  DG  3.26  1.92  2.99  1.85  0.00  9.33 
  DH  3.77  2.22  3.62  2.08  0.00  10.76 
  DJ  4.01  2.37  4.31  2.22  0.00  11.80 
  DK  3.61  2.12  3.72  2.26  0.00  10.77 
  DL  3.35  1.97  3.86  1.28  0.00  9.74 
  DM  3.38  1.98  4.05  1.29  0.00  9.95 
HUN  DA  0.00  6.37  0.52  2.02  0.65  9.12 
  DB  0.00  8.32  0.86  2.67  0.86  11.94 
  DD_DE  0.00  7.30  1.23  1.44  0.75  10.17 
  DF             
  DG  0.00  6.40  0.15  1.32  0.65  8.23 
  DH  0.00  7.39  0.93  1.46  0.76  10.05 
  DJ  0.00  7.40  1.07  1.46  0.76  10.17 
  DK  0.00  7.00  0.60  1.71  0.71  9.58 
  DL  0.00  6.10  0.00  1.48  0.62  7.93 
  DM  0.00  5.97  0.16  1.45  0.60  7.91 
NLD  DA  2.36  3.44  2.04  0.40  0.00  7.80   39 
  DB  3.21  4.68  3.69  0.45  0.00  11.12 
  DD_DE  2.54  3.71  3.20  0.28  0.00  9.13 
  DF  2.40  3.51  0.81  0.33  0.00  6.76 
  DG  2.20  3.22  1.48  0.35  0.00  6.92 
  DH  2.41  3.52  3.47  0.32  0.00  9.12 
  DJ  2.70  3.94  4.20  0.33  0.00  10.39 
  DK  2.88  4.20  3.74  0.11  0.00  10.19 
  DL  2.52  3.68  5.55  0.09  0.00  11.00 
  DM  2.82  4.11  3.67  0.10  0.00  9.98 
SVK  DA  1.55  8.98  0.22  0.00  0.82  11.10 
  DB  2.40  13.34  0.33  0.00  1.27  16.30 
  DD_DE  1.73  9.89  0.00  0.00  0.91  12.02 
  DF  1.70  9.78  0.00  0.00  0.90  11.88 
  DG  1.72  9.86  0.00  0.10  0.91  12.05 
  DH  1.96  11.10  0.00  0.00  1.04  13.44 
  DJ  1.34  7.82  0.00  0.00  0.71  9.55 
  DK  1.81  10.34  0.00  0.00  0.96  12.55 
  DL  1.76  10.07  0.65  0.00  0.93  12.73 
  DM  1.76  10.07  0.00  0.00  0.93  12.23 
SVN  DA  0.87  8.84  2.63  3.00  2.15  15.65 
  DB  1.02  10.18  4.05  3.48  2.50  18.54 
  DD_DE  0.71  7.27  3.02  2.37  1.74  13.69 
  DF             
  DG  0.63  6.51  1.23  2.19  1.55  11.24 
  DH  0.74  7.57  2.17  2.48  1.82  13.45 
  DJ  0.84  8.52  3.23  2.81  2.06  15.60 
  DK  0.78  7.91  2.29  3.19  1.91  14.50 
  DL  0.80  8.14  3.11  3.29  1.97  15.46 
  DM  0.94  9.46  4.17  3.86  2.31  18.12 
USA  DA  2.89  1.54  1.05  1.16  0.48  6.77 
  DB  3.73  1.99  2.18  2.49  0.62  10.17 
  DD_DE  3.08  1.64  1.62  0.50  0.51  6.98 
  DF  2.91  1.55  2.28  0.07  0.48  6.94 
  DG  2.57  1.36  1.14  0.00  0.42  5.30 
  DH  2.81  1.49  1.43  0.67  0.47  6.54 
  DJ  3.02  1.61  1.72  0.58  0.50  7.05 
  DK  2.65  1.41  1.62  0.32  0.44  6.16 
  DL  2.78  1.48  1.59  0.20  0.46  6.23 
  DM  2.76  1.46  2.96  0.36  0.46  7.56 
Note: For industries in bold letters no FDI data are available for the year 2003 
 